Executive Summary & Investment Thesis

Lagercrantz Group AB (Lagercrantz) represents a high-quality, long-term compounder, differentiated by a deeply ingrained decentralized culture and a disciplined “buy-and-build” M&A model. The investment case is built on three core pillars:

1. A Durable Niche Moat: The Group’s structure as a holding company for approximately 85 independent, market-leading niche technology businesses ¹ creates high, defensible margins and exceptionally low customer concentration.³
2. A Superior M&A “Machine”: Lagercrantz’s reputation as a long-term, non-interfering owner offering “evolution, not revolution” ⁴ provides a proprietary M&A pipeline. This allows it to acquire high-quality, family-owned businesses at rational multiples, typically in the 6-8x $EV/EBITA$ range ⁵, creating significant, structural value via multiple arbitrage.
3. World-Class Capital Discipline: The model’s “freedom” is balanced by the “responsibility” of a rigorous internal key performance indicator (KPI), Return on Working Capital ($P/WC$), with a target of >45%.⁷ The company’s consistent achievement of over 70% ⁸ demonstrates exceptional capital efficiency, which in turn funds a self-sustaining compounding loop.

The Group’s financial track record is a testament to this model, having delivered 15 consecutive years of record earnings per share (EPS).⁹ For the fiscal year 2024/25 (ended March 31, 2025), the company grew profit (EBT) by 16% to MSEK 1,298 while maintaining a strong 17.5% $EBITA$ margin.² This trajectory is confirmed by recent performance in the first half of fiscal year 2025/26 (ended September 30, 2025), which showed 11% revenue growth and an improving $EBITA$ margin of 17.7%.¹¹ This growth is supported by an accelerating pace of acquisitions and strategic exposure to structural tailwinds in electrification and infrastructure.¹²

The market, however, fully recognizes this quality. The stock trades at a last-twelve-months (LTM) $EV/EBITDA$ multiple of approximately 25x ¹³ and a next-twelve-months (NTM) $EV/EBITA$ multiple of approximately 25-26x.¹⁴ This represents a significant premium to its 5-year historical average of approximately 16x ¹⁵, suggesting the valuation is “fair but not cheap” and prices in continued flawless execution. Key risks include a high dependency on M&A to achieve growth targets, cyclical end-market exposure, and a more leveraged balance sheet (Net Debt/EBITA of ~2.0x) used to fund the accelerated acquisition pace.⁸

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I. COMPANY OVERVIEW: THE LAGERCRANTZ ‘BUY-AND-BUILD’ MODEL

A. The Value-Creating ‘Serial Acquirer’ Framework

Lagercrantz is not a traditional industrial manufacturer; it is a technology group.² Its core business concept is a “buy-and-build” strategy.⁹ The company’s fundamental mission is to acquire and develop small- to medium-sized (SME) technology companies that possess leading market positions in distinct niches, typically built on proprietary products.²

The entire organizational model is built on a foundation of extreme decentralization, encapsulated by the core value of “accountability and freedom”.⁹ Each of the Group’s approximately 85 subsidiaries ¹ operates as an independent business unit. Subsidiary management, which often includes the former owners, is given full profit and loss (P&L) responsibility and the autonomy to run their operations, provided they meet clear, stringent financial goals.⁴

Value is created through a simple, repeatable, three-step process:

1. Acquisition: Identifying and acquiring high-quality private companies.¹⁷
2. Organic Improvement: Providing the acquired companies with a “stable owner” ⁴, a professional board, and access to the Group’s network for support in areas like internationalization and digitalization, enabling them to accelerate organic growth.²
3. Compounding: Consistently reinvesting the strong, capital-light cash flows generated by the existing businesses into new, high-return acquisitions, creating a self-funding, high-growth “compounder”.⁹

This philosophy creates a powerful competitive advantage in M&A sourcing. Lagercrantz explicitly positions itself as a long-term, permanent owner with no exit horizon.⁴ This stands in stark contrast to a typical private equity fund. For an entrepreneur or a family looking to sell their “life’s work” while ensuring its legacy and wanting to stay involved, Lagercrantz is a highly attractive partner that offers “evolution, not revolution”.⁴ This cultural stance generates a proprietary pipeline of deals that are not widely auctioned, forming a key “moat” for the business.

B. Divisional Structure & Business Segments (FY 2024/25)

The Group’s operations are organized into five divisions. These divisions serve as a light-touch management and reporting structure, grouping the independent subsidiaries by technology or end-market focus.²

• 1. Electrify: This division, consisting of 18 companies, is most exposed to long-term structural growth trends. It provides products and solutions that meet the needs of an “increasingly electrified and connected society”.¹² Its products include electrical connection systems, IP-rated enclosures, customized cabling, and various infrastructure products. These are sold into end-markets such as electricity distribution and transmission, renewable energy, battery and charging technologies, and 5G/fibre communication networks.¹²
• 2. Control: This division (15 companies) focuses on measurement and control technology, as well as systems for moving or protecting sensitive assets in critical processes.² Products include specialized measurement instruments, supplemental vehicle control systems (e.g., He-Man), and radiation detection technology (e.g., Radonova).²
• 3. TecSec: This division (13 companies) offers a range of products and solutions for the growing security and surveillance market.²⁰ Its portfolio includes access control systems (e.g., ARAS Security, Idesco), alarms, sprinklers, fire protection, and secure audio-visual systems for modern offices.²²
• 4. Niche Products: This division is a collection of businesses that offer highly specialized, proprietary products in distinct technology niches.²¹ Examples include industrial pumps for foodstuffs, specialized industrial doors (e.g., Prido), and premium sharpening systems (e.g., Tormek).²¹
• 5. International: This division primarily serves as a platform for expansion and houses companies in markets outside of the Nordic region, with a focus on the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands.²

Division	Description & Focus	Key Products & Solutions	Key End-Markets
Electrify	Products and solutions for an electrified and connected society.	Electrical connectors, enclosures, custom cabling, infrastructure products.	Electricity distribution, renewables, EV charging, 5G/Fibre networks.
Control	Products and solutions in control and measurement technology.	Measurement instruments, vehicle control systems, radiation detection.	Industry, defence, transportation, construction.
TecSec	Products and solutions in security and surveillance.	Access control, alarms, sprinklers, fire protection, secure AV systems.	Infrastructure, security, industry, modern offices.
Niche Products	Proprietary products and solutions in selected technology niches.	Specialized pumps, industrial doors, sharpening systems.	Food industry, manufacturing, construction, prosumer.
International	Platform for businesses and expansion outside the Nordic region.	Varies by subsidiary (focus on UK, Germany, Netherlands).	Varies by subsidiary.
Table 1: Lagercrantz Group – Divisional Overview

C. Revenue Streams & Value Creation

The Group’s revenue is generated through the B2B sales of its subsidiaries’ products. A cornerstone of the Lagercrantz strategy has been a deliberate, multi-decade structural shift away from low-margin distribution and towards proprietary, high-value-add products.² The company defines “high value added” ¹⁸ as leveraging specialized technical expertise to customize, develop, and combine products into unique solutions for customers.¹⁸

The most compelling evidence of this strategy’s success is the long-term expansion of the Group’s gross margin. By actively “enhancing the degree of refinement” ²—increasing its share of proprietary products (reported at 78% ²⁵) and phasing out standard components—Lagercrantz has driven its consolidated gross margin from an average of 21% in the 2005/06 fiscal year to over 39% in the 2024/25 fiscal year.² This 1,800-basis-point expansion is the tangible, quantitative proof of the “value-add” strategy and serves as a primary driver of the Group’s high and stable profitability.

D. Customer Base & Switching Costs

Lagercrantz’s customer base is highly diversified across resilient and growing B2B sectors, including electric power generation and distribution, electronics, construction, IT, transport, and telecommunication.³

• Customer Concentration: Customer concentration at the Group level is extremely low. No single customer accounts for more than approximately 5% of consolidated sales.³ At the subsidiary level, the ten largest customers typically account for about two-thirds of that specific company’s sales ³, which is expected for a business focused on a deep and narrow niche.
• Geographic Mix (FY 2024/25): The company is increasingly international, with 42% of its business volume now originating outside the Nordic countries.² The mix is: Sweden (32%), Denmark (11%), Norway (9%), UK (8%), Finland (6%), and Rest of World (34%).² This M&A-driven diversification has successfully reduced reliance on its home market.
• Switching Costs: While not explicitly quantified, high switching costs are an implied and necessary component of the business model. Lagercrantz acquires companies precisely because they have “strong market positions in niches” ¹⁷ and “high value added”.¹⁸

• The products are often proprietary, highly technical, and customized for a specific customer application.²
• They are frequently specified into a customer’s larger system, such as a unique electrical connector in a power grid, an access control system for a secure facility, or a control component in a vehicle.¹²
• These components are often mission-critical but represent a small fraction of the customer’s total project cost.
• Consequently, the customer’s cost to switch is not primarily monetary, but procedural and operational.²⁸ Switching suppliers would require finding and validating a new component, and potentially re-engineering or re-certifying the entire end-product. This risk, effort, and time create a significant barrier to change, fostering sticky customer relationships, reducing cyclicality, and granting the pricing power evident in the Group’s high-margin profile.

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II. INDUSTRY DYNAMICS & COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE

A. Analysis of Key End-Markets & Structural Tailwinds

Lagercrantz’s portfolio of companies is strategically positioned to be a key beneficiary of several powerful, long-term secular trends:

• Electrification & Energy Transition: This is the most significant tailwind. The Electrify division ¹² directly serves markets benefiting from grid modernization, the expansion of electricity distribution and transmission, renewable energy generation (solar and wind), and the critical build-out of EV charging and battery infrastructure.
• Digitalization & Connectivity: The societal need for robust 5G and fibre networks ¹², as well as secure data communication ³, drives sustainable demand for specialized cabling, enclosures, and connection systems.
• Automation: The Control division ² provides measurement, sensor, and control technologies that are essential enabling components for industrial automation.
• Security & Safety: The TecSec division ²¹ directly benefits from a growing global emphasis on physical and digital security, access control, surveillance, and fire protection.
• Sustainability: Many of the Group’s products act as “enablers” of sustainability, such as energy-efficient enclosures (Elkapsling) or fastening systems for solar panels (CW Lundberg).¹²

B. The ‘Nordic Serial Acquirer’ Competitive Landscape

Lagercrantz does not compete in the traditional sense of a single industrial company. Its primary competitors are its peers in the “Nordic Serial Acquirer” space, with whom it competes for high-quality M&A targets.³⁰

This business model was largely perfected in Sweden. Lagercrantz, Addtech, and AddLife were all spun out of the original Bergman & Beving (B&B) group.³⁰ This “shared DNA” explains the common cultural adherence to a decentralized, “buy-and-build” philosophy. The most direct and relevant peers for Lagercrantz are Addtech (ADDT-B.ST), Indutrade (INDT.ST), and Lifco (LIFCO-B.ST).³⁴

While culturally similar, there are points of differentiation:

• Lagercrantz vs. Addtech: Both are B&B spin-offs and are very similar, utilizing a highly decentralized M&A sourcing model where subsidiaries are key to finding new targets.¹⁷
• Lagercrantz vs. Indutrade: Indutrade is generally perceived as being more centralized in its M&A and operational oversight compared to the “purer” decentralized models of Lagercrantz and Lifco.³⁷
• Lagercrantz vs. Lifco: Both are highly decentralized. Lifco’s portfolio is more rigidly structured into three distinct verticals (Dental, Demolition & Tools, Systems Solutions) ³⁸, whereas Lagercrantz’s five divisions appear more fluid and operationally focused.²

A key differentiator for Lagercrantz is its relative size. As the smallest of these “big four” Swedish acquirers, its M&A “runway” is arguably the longest.³⁵ It can continue to acquire companies in its target SEK 40-400 million revenue range for decades to come, whereas larger peers may need to pursue larger, and potentially riskier, deals to “move the needle” on growth.

Company	LTM Revenue (approx.)	LTM EBITA Margin	Recent Organic Growth	Recent Acquired Growth	Key Business Model Trait
Lagercrantz	~SEK 10.0 Billion	17.7% (H1 25/26)	+3% (Q1 25/26)	+10% (Q1 25/26)	Decentralized “Good Owner” Model 8
Lifco	~SEK 27.5 Billion	22.2% (9-mo 2025)	+4.3% (9-mo 2025)	N/A (Acq. drove ~9% net)	Pure decentralized; 3 distinct verticals 38
Addtech	~SEK 21.8 Billion	15.0% (FY 24/25)	+2% (FY 24/25)	+7% (FY 24/25)	B&B spin-off; decentralized M&A 42
Indutrade	~SEK 32.5 Billion	~14.6% (LTM Q2 2025)	-4% (Q2 2025)	+3% (Q2 2025)	More centralized M&A/operations 44
Table 2: ‘Nordic Serial Acquirer’ Peer Comparison (LTM Data as of Q2/Q3 2025). Revenue is LTM, calculated from cited reports.

C. Lagercrantz’s Competitive Moat

The Group’s moat is not a single product or patent but a system and culture that is extremely difficult to replicate.

1. Structural Niche Dominance: The Group is a diversified portfolio of approximately 85 small “monopolies”.¹ Each subsidiary was acquired because it already had a dominant position, proprietary technology, and high barriers to entry in its specific niche.¹⁷ The Group’s diversification across these non-correlated niches smooths out cyclicality.²
2. The M&A Engine as a Moat: As discussed, the “good owner” culture ⁴ creates a proprietary deal flow, which is a significant barrier to competitors trying to replicate the “buy-and-build” model.
3. The P/WC Governance System: The use of a simple, powerful KPI ($P/WC$ > 45%) ⁷ allows the Group to scale its decentralized model without collapsing into chaos. It enforces extreme capital discipline at the subsidiary level. This system is the moat.

D. Barriers to Entry

Barriers to entry for a new serial acquirer attempting to replicate this model are formidable. It would require:

1. Decades of Trust: Building the reputation required to be the “buyer of choice” for entrepreneurs.³⁰
2. A Unique Culture: Instilling a deeply-rooted culture of decentralization (“freedom and responsibility”), which is counter-intuitive to most corporate management structures.⁹
3. An M&A “Machine”: A decentralized network capable of sourcing, evaluating, and integrating 5-10+ deals per year, every year, without disrupting the underlying businesses.⁸

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III. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE & GROWTH HISTORY (FY 2020-2025)

A. Revenue and Earnings Growth: Deconstructing the Twin Engines

The company’s most prominent metric is its 15 consecutive years of all-time high EPS, achieved as of the 2024/25 fiscal year.⁹ This demonstrates an extraordinarily consistent and resilient value-creation model.

This consistency is driven by an explicit growth formula: management’s stated goal is to grow profit (EBT) by at least 15% per year over a business cycle. This growth is explicitly targeted to come approximately one-third from organic initiatives and two-thirds from M&A.⁹

Fiscal Year 2024/25 (ended Mar 31, 2025) Performance: ²

• Net Revenue: Increased 16% to MSEK 9,389.
• Growth Deconstruction: Acquired growth was +14%, while organic growth was +2%.
• Profit (EBT): Increased 16% to MSEK 1,298.¹⁰
• EPS: Increased 16% to SEK 4.93.¹⁰

First Half 2025/26 (ended Sep 30, 2025) Performance: ¹¹

• Net Revenue: Increased 11% to MSEK 4,930.
• Profit (EBT): Increased 15% to MSEK 686.

The performance in fiscal year 2024/25 shows the model working exactly as designed. In a challenging macroeconomic year where organic growth was a sluggish +2%, the M&A engine (at +14%) more than compensated, allowing the company to hit its +16% profit growth target.² The model is built to perform through the cycle by using acquisition-led growth to offset periods of weaker organic demand.⁸

Fiscal Year (ending Mar 31)	Net Revenue (MSEK)	Revenue Growth (%)	EBITA (MSEK)	EBITA Margin (%)	EBT (MSEK)	EBT Growth (%)	Diluted EPS (SEK)	EPS Growth (%)
2021	4,683	17.0%	711	15.2%	587	15.0%	2.27	14.6%
2022	5,744	22.6%	935	16.3%	794	35.3%	3.09	36.1%
2023	8,129	41.5%	1,431	17.6%	1,116	40.6%	4.25	37.5%
2024	9,389	15.5%	1,646	17.5%	1,298	16.3%	4.93	16.0%
LTM Q2 2026	10,034	N/A	1,746	17.4%	1,390	N/A	5.32	N/A
Table 3: 5-Year Financial Summary (FY 2021-2024). Data compiled from.2 LTM (Last Twelve Months) as of Sep 30, 2025, calculated from interim reports.

Fiscal Year (ending Mar 31)	Total Revenue Growth (%)	Organic Growth (%)	Acquired Growth (%)	Currency/Other (%)
2023	41.5%	11%	28%	2.5%
2024	15.5%	-1%	11%	5.5%
2025	15.5%	2%	14%	-0.5%
Q1 2026	9.8%	3%	10%	-3.2%
Table 4: Organic vs. Acquired Revenue Growth (FY 2023-2025, Q1 2026). Data compiled from 2 and prior-year reports.

B. Profitability and Margin Analysis

Lagercrantz’s profitability profile is marked by high and improving margins.

• Gross Margin: As analyzed in Section I.C, the long-term trend is positive, with the gross margin expanding from ~21% to over 39% as the business has shifted to high-value-add proprietary products.²
• EBITA Margin: The Group has demonstrated highly stable and strengthening operating margins, even during periods of high inflation and M&A activity.

• FY 2023/24: 17.6% ²
• FY 2024/25: 17.5% ²
• Q1 2025/26: 17.5% ⁸
• Q2 2025/26: 17.9% ¹¹

The ability to improve the $EBITA$ margin to a record 17.9% in the most recent quarter ¹¹, despite a massive wave of M&A activity, is remarkable. It demonstrates that the acquisition criteria (requiring targets to have >15% $EBITA$ margins ¹⁷) are strictly enforced and that the “light-touch” integration model is effective at preserving and enhancing profitability.

C. Return on Capital Analysis: The Heart of the Model

The Group’s capital efficiency is its most impressive characteristic and the true engine of its compounding model.

• Stated Goals: The Group’s financial goals are 1) 15% annual earnings growth, and 2) Return on Equity (ROE) of not less than 25%.⁷
• Return on Equity (ROE): The company consistently exceeds this goal.

• FY 2023/24: 27% ¹⁰
• FY 2024/25: 28% ⁸
• LTM as of Q2 2025/26: 30% ¹¹

• Return on Investment (ROIC): Reported at 11.8% (TTM).²⁶ The high ROE is a more representative metric of the shareholder experience, as the model’s deliberate use of leverage amplifies returns on the equity base.
• The P/WC Metric (Return on Working Capital): This is the most important internal metric for understanding the company.

• Definition: Profit before net financial items (EBIT) as a percentage of average working capital (WC). Working capital is defined as inventories plus trade receivables, less trade payables.⁴⁸
• Strategic Importance: This goal is “converted internally” ⁷ and pushed down to every single business unit.⁷ It forces 85 subsidiary managers to be relentlessly focused on capital efficiency. They must generate the maximum profit (EBIT) from the minimum investment in working capital. This is what drives the Group’s powerful cash generation.
• Performance: The target is >45%.⁷ The actual performance as of Q1 2025/26 was 75%.⁸

This exceptional P/WC result is the cultural and financial lynchpin of the entire group. It demonstrates that the decentralized “freedom” is more than balanced by this financial “responsibility.” This KPI ensures that growth is not only profitable but also highly cash-generative, which in turn provides the cash to fuel the M&A engine, completing the virtuous cycle.

D. Free Cash Flow Generation and Cash Conversion

The intense focus on P/WC translates directly into strong and predictable free cash flow.

• For the 2024/25 fiscal year, cash flow from operating activities was strong at MSEK 1,322.²
• For the first half of 2025/26, cash flow from operating activities was MSEK 553.¹¹

This cash flow is the “fuel” for the M&A engine. Lagercrantz’s business model is explicitly designed to be self-funding.⁹ Unlike many acquirers, Lagercrantz does not need to frequently issue new shares and dilute existing shareholders to fund its growth.⁵⁰

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IV. CAPITAL ALLOCATION STRATEGY

A. The M&A Engine: Target Profile, Frequency, and Integration

M&A is the Group’s primary capital allocation priority, as it is the main driver of its growth model.¹⁸

• Target Profile: The criteria are clear, consistent, and highly disciplined ²:

1. Business: B2B technology companies.
2. Position: Strong, leading market position in a well-defined niche.
3. Products: A focus on proprietary products or high-value-add distribution.
4. Size: Annual revenue typically between MSEK 40 to MSEK 400.
5. Profitability: A proven, stable $EBITA$ margin of >15%.
6. Management: Strong, established management who will stay on post-acquisition.

• Frequency: The stated goal is 5-8 acquisitions per year.¹⁸ The recent pace has significantly exceeded this. The Group completed seven acquisitions in FY2024/25.² In the subsequent ~16 months (since April 2024), it has announced or completed eleven more, including five in the first half of the 2025/26 fiscal year.⁸ This demonstrates a robust pipeline and an intent to deploy capital.
• Multiples Paid (The ‘Arbitrage’): This is the central mechanism for value creation. Analyst reports and company examples confirm a historical acquisition range of 6-8x $EV/EBITA$.⁵ For example, the February 2024 acquisition of Prido, a niche leader in industrial doors, was completed at an $EV/EBITA$ multiple of ~7x.⁶ Lagercrantz uses its strong cash flow to buy these private, high-quality companies at 6-8x $EBITA$. By integrating these earnings into the Group—which trades at a public-market valuation of ~25x+ $EV/EBITDA$ ¹³—Lagercrantz captures a massive and immediate “multiple arbitrage.” It is systematically buying assets at 7x and having the market re-value them overnight at 25x.
• Integration: The “Lagercrantz model” is one of minimal integration. It is “evolution, not revolution”.⁴ The acquired company retains its name, brand, and management team.⁴ Lagercrantz provides support via active board work, strategic planning, and access to its network.⁴ This low-touch approach is what makes them an attractive buyer and minimizes integration risk.⁵¹

B. Analysis of Shareholder Returns (Dividend Policy and History)

Dividends are the primary method of returning capital to shareholders but are a secondary priority to M&A.

• Dividend Policy: The stated goal is to pay out 30-50% of the Group’s average profit after taxes over a business cycle.¹⁹
• Track Record: The dividend has grown consistently in line with earnings.⁵² For the 2024/25 fiscal year, the Board proposed a dividend of SEK 2.20 per share, a 16% increase from the prior year’s SEK 1.90.² Based on the FY2024/25 EPS of SEK 4.93 ², this represents a payout ratio of ~45% ⁵⁴, which is perfectly aligned with the stated policy.
• Share Buybacks: The company has no significant buyback program.⁵² This is the correct capital allocation decision. For a serial acquirer, every krona of cash must be benchmarked against the returns from M&A. Buying back its own stock (at a ~25x $EV/EBITDA$ multiple) would be value-destructive when it can deploy that same krona to acquire a new company (at a ~7x $EV/EBITA$ multiple).

C. Balance Sheet Strength and Financial Flexibility

The balance sheet is being actively used to fund the accelerated M&A pace.

• Leverage Trend: Operating net debt increased from MSEK 2,342 as of June 30, 2024, to MSEK 3,359 as of June 30, 2025 (Q1 2025/26).⁸
• Leverage Ratios: As of the end of Q1 2025/26 (June 30, 2025), LTM $EBITA$ was MSEK 1,692.⁸ This implies a Net Debt / $EBITA$ ratio of ~1.98x. The equity ratio has compressed from 36% in Q1 2024 to 34% in Q1 2025, and further to 31% as of Q2 2025/26 (September 30, 2025).⁸

Leverage is elevated relative to the company’s history but is not yet at a dangerous level. The interest coverage ratio is a healthy 10.9x ⁵⁵, and debt is well-covered by operating cash flow.⁵⁵ This leverage is a deliberate capital structure choice to amplify the high ROE (30% LTM).¹¹ However, the 31% equity ratio is likely near the low end of management’s comfort zone.

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V. MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS & CHALLENGES (2023-2025)

A. Analysis of Recent Quarterly Performance (H1 FY 2025/26)

Recent performance has reinforced the strength of the business model.

• Q1 2025/26 (Apr-Jun 2025): A “good start” to the year.⁸

• Revenue: +10% to MSEK 2,473.⁸
• Growth Breakdown: 3% organic, 10% acquired, -3% currency.⁸
• $EBITA$: +12% to MSEK 432, with the margin expanding to 17.5% from 17.1% pcp.⁸
• Q2 2025/26 (Jul-Sep 2025): “Continued positive contributions from acquisitions”.¹¹

• $EBITA$: +14% (for the quarter) to MSEK 440.¹¹
• $EBITA$ Margin: Improved again to a record 17.9%.¹¹
• H1 Profit (EBT): +15% to MSEK 686.¹¹

The business is showing remarkable stability. The M&A engine is successfully driving double-digit growth, while margins are simultaneously improving to record highs. This demonstrates high-quality execution and disciplined cost control.

Quarter	Net Revenue (MSEK)	Revenue Growth (%)	Organic Growth (%)	Acquired Growth (%)	EBITA (MSEK)	EBITA Margin (%)
Q4 2023/24	2,159	5.6%	-4.0%	10.0%	390	18.1%
Q1 2024/25	2,253	14.8%	2.0%	13.0%	386	17.1%
Q2 2024/25	2,172	10.0%	-2.0%	13.0%	387	17.8%
Q3 2024/25	2,461	18.4%	5.0%	13.0%	433	17.6%
Q4 2024/25	2,503	15.9%	4.0%	12.0%	446	17.8%
Q1 2025/26	2,473	9.8%	3.0%	10.0%	432	17.5%
Q2 2025/26	2,457	13.1%	N/A	N/A	440	17.9%
Table 5: Recent Quarterly Performance. Data compiled from 2 and prior-year reports.

B. Macroeconomic Factors and Operational Response

The primary challenge in 2023-2024 was a weaker macroeconomic environment, which led to sluggish organic growth of +2% in FY 2024/25 ² and a -1% decline in FY 2023/24. The CEO has noted “geopolitical uncertainty” and “discussions around trade barriers” as ongoing concerns.⁹

The company’s response was not to restructure or panic, but to execute the model. As CEO Jörgen Wigh has stated, the model is explicitly designed so that “periods of weaker market conditions with lower organic growth can be offset by good acquisition-led growth”.⁸ This is precisely what Lagercrantz did, accelerating M&A to deliver 16% profit growth in FY25 despite the organic headwind.²

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VI. GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES & OUTLOOK

A. Key Organic Growth Drivers

The Electrify division is the Group’s primary organic growth engine, positioned to ride long-term secular waves of electrification, grid investment, and renewable energy adoption.¹² Further organic growth will come from the continuous “refinement” strategy ², pushing proprietary products into new customer segments and international markets.²

B. M&A Pipeline and Acquisition-Led Growth

The M&A runway remains the most compelling part of the long-term growth story. The M&A market for small, private tech companies in Europe and North America is vast and fragmented.³⁵ As the smallest of the “big four” Swedish acquirers, Lagercrantz has the longest runway.³⁵ Its recent successful M&A outside the Nordics is just the beginning of this international scaling.³⁹ Management remains committed to its target of 5-8 acquisitions per year ¹⁸ and has confirmed the M&A market remains “favourable”.⁸

C. Management’s Stated Strategic Priorities & Targets

Management’s long-term financial goal is to double the Group’s profit every five years.⁹ In autumn 2023, this was crystallized into a specific goal: to double profit to MSEK 2 billion (EBT) within five years.⁸

• Progress Check: The baseline for this goal (FY 2022/23) was EBT of MSEK 1,116.² The target is ~MSEK 2,000 by FY 2028/29.

• As of FY 2024/25, EBT reached MSEK 1,298.²
• As of LTM Q2 2025/26, EBT stands at approximately MSEK 1,390 (calculated from ²).
• The company is well on track to meet this goal, driven by its consistent execution of the 15% annual profit growth target.⁷

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VII. MANAGEMENT & GOVERNANCE

A. Management Team Track Record and Vision

The quality of the management team, led by President and CEO Jörgen Wigh ⁹ and CFO Peter Thysell ⁵⁷, is best measured by its track record. Delivering 15 consecutive years of record EPS ⁹ is an elite, world-class performance. It demonstrates a mastery of the “buy-and-build” model, excellence in capital allocation, and the stewardship of a deep-seated, consistent culture.

The strategic vision is clear, consistent, and communicated effectively: grow profit 15% per year by acquiring good companies, providing them with a stable home, and letting them thrive.⁹ There is no “strategic drift.”

B. Insider Ownership and Alignment

The Group’s governance and alignment are exceptionally strong.

• Anchor Shareholder: The largest shareholder is “Anders Börjesson & Tisenhult-gruppen”.⁵⁴ Anders Börjesson was the CEO of Bergman & Beving in the 1990s who implemented the decentralized model and subsequently spun off Lagercrantz and Addtech.³⁰ The presence of the “architect” of the entire system as the largest, long-term anchor shareholder provides unparalleled stability and strategic alignment.
• Institutional Ownership: Ownership is high at ~59% ⁵⁹, with a high-quality, long-term registry that includes Fidelity, SEB Fonder, and Swedbank Robur.⁵⁴
• Management Alignment: The true alignment mechanism is not just stock options ¹⁹, but the $P/WC$ target.⁷ This system aligns the financial incentives of 85 subsidiary managers (autonomy, profit responsibility, bonuses) with the capital efficiency goals of the parent company (cash flow for M&A).

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VIII. VALUATION ANALYSIS

A. Current Valuation Multiples vs. Historical Ranges

Lagercrantz’s quality is fully reflected in its valuation. As of November 2025, the stock trades at a significant premium.

• Current Multiples (LTM):

• P/E (TTM): ~36x – 41x ⁶⁰
• P/B (TTM): ~11.7x ⁶⁰
• $EV/EBITDA$ (LTM): ~25.2x ¹³
• $EV/EBIT$ (LTM): ~34.4x ¹³
• Historical Context: The stock has undergone a massive re-rating. Its 5-year average NTM $EV/EBITDA$ was approximately 16x.¹⁵ Recent analyst reports from 2025 confirm the share is trading at a premium of ~60-70% to this 5-year average.¹⁵ The market has “discovered” the quality of the Nordic serial acquirer model and has aggressively re-rated the entire group, particularly since 2020.¹⁵

Metric	Current LTM (Nov 2025)	5-Year Historical Average (approx.)	Premium / (Discount)
P/E (TTM)	~40.9x 61	N/A	N/A
P/B (TTM)	~11.7x 60	N/A	N/A
$EV/EBITDA$ (LTM)	~25.2x 13	~16.0x (NTM) 15	~+58% (vs. NTM avg.)
$EV/EBITA$ (NTM)	~26.0x 15	~16.0x (NTM) 15	~+63%
Table 6: Valuation Multiples Analysis

B. Valuation vs. Relevant Peers

Lagercrantz’s premium valuation is not an outlier; it is in line with its high-quality peer group.¹⁵ An analyst report in 2025 noted its 26x NTM $EV/EBITA$ was in line with the peer average: -6% vs. Lifco, +5% vs. Indutrade, and +3% vs. Addtech.¹⁵ The entire sector has re-rated post-2017 ³⁹, reflecting a “scarcity premium” for vehicles that offer durable, compounding growth.

C. Valuation Assessment

The valuation is high, but it is supported by elite financial metrics: an LTM ROE of 30% ¹¹, a $P/WC$ of 75% ⁸, and a 15-year track record of 16%+ EPS growth.² The market is paying a premium for a company that can structurally buy private assets at 7x $EBITA$ ⁶ and compound that value.

The current valuation is not attractive in a traditional sense; it is expensive.⁶¹ It reflects a “fair price for a wonderful company,” with a low margin of safety, as the price already bakes in the continued flawless execution of the 15% profit growth target.

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IX. KEY RISKS & CONSIDERATIONS

A. Dependency on M&A for Growth and Execution Risks

The primary risk is the model’s high dependency on M&A for approximately two-thirds of its growth.⁹ This “heavy reliance” ⁵¹ creates two core risks:

1. Pipeline Risk: Competition for M&A targets could increase, or the pipeline of suitable, high-quality companies could dry up.
2. Execution Risk: Management could “overpay” or “botch” an integration, leading to goodwill impairments.51
   Mitigants: The M&A market for their niche remains vast and fragmented (“a drop in the ocean”).35 Furthermore, the decentralized, “small-deal” model 17 minimizes the impact of any single bad deal. The “soft” integration approach 4 also minimizes “integration risk” as there is little actual “integrating” to do.

B. Exposure to Cyclical End Markets and Economic Sensitivity

The Group’s earnings are sensitive to the macroeconomic cycle and geopolitical uncertainty 8, as evidenced by the weak +2% organic growth in FY25.2 A severe recession would impact demand.

Mitigants: Extreme diversification across ~85 companies, multiple end-markets 3, and geographies 2 provides significant ballast.2 The business model is also designed to be counter-cyclical, using its strong balance sheet to acquire companies (often at better prices) during downturns, offsetting weak organic growth.8

C. Financial Leverage and Structural Risks

A new risk to monitor is the rising financial leverage. With a Net Debt/EBITA ratio of ~2.0x ⁸ and an equity ratio of 31% ¹¹, the balance sheet is less “fortress-like” than in prior years. A severe downturn combined with this higher debt load could pressure the company’s flexibility and its ability to conduct M&A. Additionally, as a Swedish company reporting in SEK with 42% of revenue from non-Nordic countries ², foreign exchange fluctuations are a major source of volatility and a key financial risk ⁶³, as seen by the -3% currency headwind in Q1 2025/26.⁸

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X. SUMMARY ASSESSMENT

Business Quality (A+): Lagercrantz is a premier example of the “Nordic Serial Acquirer” model. Its quality is rooted in a resilient, decentralized culture that attracts and retains entrepreneurial talent. Its internal governance, centered on the $P/WC$ metric, ensures this decentralized freedom is paired with world-class capital discipline.

Competitive Position (A): The moat is the system itself. This system—which creates a proprietary M&A pipeline, extracts high-return growth, and self-funds—is durable and exceptionally difficult to replicate.

Growth Potential (B+): The company is on a clear and credible path to achieve its goal of doubling profit by FY 2028/29.⁸ The M&A runway remains long, especially internationally.³⁵ Structural tailwinds in electrification provide a solid organic underpin.¹²

Overall Assessment: Lagercrantz represents a compelling long-term investment opportunity for investors seeking a high-quality “compounder.” The 15-year track record ⁹ of uninterrupted EPS growth validates the model. The business is designed to create value through the economic cycle by redeploying capital-light cash flows at high rates of return (via M&A at ~7x $EBITA$).⁶

The investment case would deteriorate if:

1. $P/WC$ Declines: A sustained fall in the Return on Working Capital metric below its >45% target would signal a critical loss of capital discipline.⁷
2. M&A Multiples Rise: Evidence of the company consistently paying 10-12x+ $EBITA$ for acquisitions would signal that the structural “arbitrage” at the heart of the model is eroding.
3. Leverage Creep: A continued rise in Net Debt/EBITA above 2.5x-3.0x would introduce significant financial risk and limit M&A capacity.

In conclusion, the company’s quality is undeniable, but its valuation is equally high. The current stock price (as of November 2025) appears to fully and fairly reflect the company’s superior fundamentals, offering little margin of safety for new investors.

Frequently Asked Questions

• Are earnings at a cyclical high or cyclical low? Earnings appear to be in a stable, mid-cycle phase. Management describes the current market in general as “stable”. However, there are mixed dynamics; the market for electrification and infrastructure is favorable , while demand from the construction-related sectors remains “sluggish”.  
• Are earnings driven primarily by the external environment (commodity producer), or internal company actions? Earnings are driven primarily by internal company actions. The company is not a commodity producer, and its earnings are “largely unaffected by commodity prices”. The core business model is that of a “serial acquirer,” and its strategy is to use acquisition-led growth to offset periods of weaker external market conditions.  
• Can this business be easily understood? The business concept is straightforward, but its structure is complex. Lagercrantz is not a single operating company but a “Tech Group,” or holding company, of approximately 80-85 independent subsidiaries, each a leader in a specific B2B technology niche. The Group’s primary activity is acquiring and developing more of these companies. The complexity lies in its high diversification, not a single product line.  
• Can this company be undermined by foreign, low-cost labor? This is unlikely. The company has strategically shifted away from low-margin, standard components. Its focus is on “high value added” solutions and “proprietary products,” which account for approximately 79-80% of sales. This focus on technical expertise and customization insulates it from competition based purely on low-cost labor.  
• Do brands matter in the business? Or is this a commodity producer? The company is not a commodity producer. Brands are critical, but at the subsidiary level. The business model is to acquire companies that already have strong market positions and proprietary products in their niche. The brand and reputation of these individual businesses are a key asset. The “Lagercrantz” brand itself is important for its M&A strategy, positioning it as a stable, long-term owner to entrepreneurs.  
• Does the company have assets that are not fully recognized in the balance sheet? Yes. The company’s most valuable assets are intangible and not fully reflected on the balance sheet. These include the strong, niche market positions of its 80+ subsidiaries , its decentralized corporate culture , and its reputation as a preferred, long-term owner, which generates a proprietary pipeline of M&A opportunities.  
• Does the company issue large amounts of new shares to insiders? The company has incentive programs that issue call options to senior executives and managers. In 2024, 800,000 call options were subscribed by 79 executives , and in 2025, another 800,000 call options were subscribed by 92 executives.  
• Has the business environment changed recently? The overall environment is described as “mainly stable”. The most notable recent change is an increase in “geopolitical uncertainty” and “discussions around trade barriers,” though these have not yet had a significant impact on demand. The primary headwind has been sluggish demand from the construction sector.  
• Has the company made any significant acquisitions recently? Yes, the company maintains a high pace of acquisitions. In the first six months of the 2025/26 fiscal year (April–September 2025), it completed five acquisitions that add approximately MSEK 582 in total annual revenue.  
• Has the company recently changed accounting policies? A minor change was noted in the Q1 2025/26 report: “a new assessment is applied to two internal loans in DKK to the Danish holding company. The loans are now classified as financial loans”. The report also stated that no new IFRS standards have been adopted that have a significant effect on the Group’s results.  
• How CapEx hungry is this business? What % of cash from operations must be spent on CapEx to sustain the business? The business is not capital-intensive. The model is focused on acquiring high-value-add technology and distribution companies. The company demonstrates solid cash conversion, with a historical median lease-adjusted free cash flow to EBITA (FCFF/EBITA) of approximately 74% , implying maintenance capital expenditures are a low percentage of cash flow.  
• How conservative is the company’s accounting? Are they over- or under- stating earnings? The provided materials do not offer an opinion on the conservatism of the company’s accounting. The financial statements are prepared in accordance with IFRS and generally accepted accounting principles in Sweden.  
• How many options / shares is the management issuing to insiders? Is it more than 10% of net income? The 2025 call option program for senior management consisted of 800,000 options. The total market value of this transfer (at SEK 27.45 per option) was approximately MSEK 22. This represents about 2.2% of the 2024/25 net income (MSEK 1,019) , which is well below 10%.  
• How much free cash flow does the business generate? How does management use this free cash flow? What is their philosophy? The business is highly cash-generative. For the first six months of the 2025/26 fiscal year, cash flow from operating activities was MSEK 553. On a trailing-twelve-month basis, free cash flow was reported at MSEK 1,186. Management’s philosophy is to use this cash flow as fuel for its growth. The primary use is reinvestment into new acquisitions , followed by paying a sustainable dividend.  
• How profitable is this business? What is the return on capital invested? Return on equity? The business is highly profitable. The operating (EBITA) margin for the first six months of 2025/26 was 17.7%. The company’s goal for Return on Equity (ROE) is at least 25% ; its actual ROE for the latest 12-month period was 30%. The median Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) over the past decade was approximately 13%.  
• How profitable is this industry? Are there a lot of competitors? What are the barriers to entry? The company operates in two “industries”:
  1. Niche Technology (Subsidiaries): The subsidiaries operate in profitable, niche markets. Barriers to entry are high, protected by proprietary technology, deep customization, and high customer switching costs.  
  2. Serial Acquirers (Parent Co.): Lagercrantz competes with other acquirers like Addtech, Indutrade, and Lifco for M&A targets. Barriers to entry for creating a new serial acquirer are formidable, as they are cultural and reputational, requiring decades of trust and a unique decentralized model.  
• How stable are revenues? How much do they fluctuate with the economy? Revenues are relatively stable due to extreme diversification across ~85 companies in different niches and geographies. Management notes this broad exposure provides stability and that a downturn in one sector has only a “minor effect on the Group’s overall performance”. However, the business is economically sensitive; organic growth was 3% in Q1 2025/26, reflecting sluggishness in sectors like construction.  
• Is net income diverging from cash from operations? No, cash generation is strong and tracks net income closely. For the first six months of 2025/26, profit after taxes was MSEK 523, while cash flow from operating activities was slightly higher at MSEK 553. This reflects a strong historical cash conversion.  
• Is the company buying back shares? Paying dividends? The company’s primary capital return is its dividend. The policy is to pay out 30-50% of net profit. A dividend of SEK 2.20 per share was proposed for the 2024/25 fiscal year. The company has a mandate for share repurchases but did not buy back any shares during the 2024/25 fiscal year and has no formal buyback plan.  
• Is the stock and ADR? What are the ADR fees? Is the stock an MLP? Is there a K1 issued to investors? The stock is Lagercrantz Group AB (publ), listed on the Nasdaq Stockholm exchange. The available information does not indicate that it is an ADR (American Depositary Receipt) or an MLP (Master Limited Partnership), nor is there any mention of K1 forms.  
• Outlook for the company’s products and services? How big will this market be? Is it growing? Shrinking? Domestic or international? The outlook is positive, driven by long-term structural trends. The “Electrify” division is a key growth engine, benefiting from investments in electrification, modern infrastructure, renewable energy, and connectivity (5G/fibre). This underlying market is estimated to grow 5-15% annually. The market is increasingly international; while Northern Europe is the core market, the company is active in nine Northern European countries plus the USA, China, and India.  
• Recent changes in the business, new markets, new production facilities, what’s changed recently? New management? The most significant recent change is the continued high pace of acquisitions, with five new companies added in the first six months of the 2025/26 fiscal year. This is the Group’s primary method for entering new niches. There have been no recent changes to senior management; Jörgen Wigh remains CEO and Peter Thysell remains CFO.  
• What are the motivations of management? Do they own a lot of stock and options? Management’s incentives appear strongly aligned with shareholders. Insiders (including management) hold a “meaningful stake” worth approximately kr1.4 billion. CEO Jörgen Wigh, who has been CEO since 2006, owns about 1.1% of the company’s shares and 2.8-3% of the votes. Management is also incentivized through annual call option programs.  
• What are the recent news on the company? The most recent major news is the Q2 2025/26 interim report, published on October 24, 2025. This report showed a 14% increase in operating profit (EBITA) and a record-high EBITA margin of 17.9% for the quarter. Other recent items include the full subscription of its 2025 call option program on October 1, 2025.  
• What factors would cause the stock to decline? Are these factors controlled by the company or the external environment? Key risks include external factors like “geopolitical uncertainty” and a deteriorating “economic situation”. Internal risks include a heavy reliance on acquisitions; if the M&A pipeline slows or if the company fails to successfully integrate new businesses, it could lead to goodwill impairments.  
• What is the nature of competition? Do brand names matter? What are the customers switching costs? This is a repeat of a previous question. The Group competes with other serial acquirers (like Addtech, Indutrade) to buy companies. Its subsidiaries face limited direct competition, as they are chosen for their “strong market position in a niche”. The subsidiaries’ brand names are important in those niches. Customer switching costs are high and “procedural” (time, effort) rather than purely financial, as the products are often customized and mission-critical.  
• What is the risk of a catastrophic loss on this investment? * What is the chance of a total loss? The risk of a total loss appears low. The Group is highly diversified, with approximately 85 independent companies in different niches and geographies. This structure provides significant stability, as a major failure in one unit would have a “minor effect on the Group’s overall performance”.  
• What off B/S liabilities does the company have? The materials indicate the company has liabilities related to its acquisitions, such as “contingent considerations and put/call options”.  
• What is the compensation policy of directors and management? The compensation policy for senior management and key employees includes incentive schemes, most notably annual call option programs that allow them to acquire shares at a set exercise price.  

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